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Comment
Executive Veto, Congressional Compromise, and
Judicial Confusion: The 1991 Civil Rights
Act-Does It Apply Retroactively?
I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 ("the Act")' into law.2 Congress, in passing the Act,
found that the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio 3 had "weakened the scope and effectiveness of federal
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (to be codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
2. President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1701-02 (November 21, 1991) [hereinafter President's Statement] (announcing the signing of S. 1745).
3. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The 1991 Act overruled five 1989 Supreme Court decisions.
Compare § 101(b), 105 Stat. at 1072-73 (stating that "the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts")
with Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989) (holding that § 1981
protection in the making of contracts "does not extend.., to conduct by the employer
after the contract relation has been established"); compare § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074 (requiring plaintiffs in discrimination cases to demonstrate disparate impact "in accordance
with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of 'alternative
employment practice' ") with Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
(decided June 5, 1989); compare § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075 ("an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for employment practice, even though other
factorsalso motivated the practice") (emphasis added) with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (holding that "once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by providing that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not allowed gender to play such a role") (footnote omitted); compare § 108, 105 Stat.
at 1076 (forbidding challenges to consent decrees by those persons who, prior to the entry
of the decree, either: (1) had actual notice of the decree sufficient to apprise that person
that the decree might adversely affect his or her interests; or (2) had his or her interests
adequately represented by another person with a similar fact situation who challenged the
decree on the same legal grounds) with Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1989)
(holding that plaintiffs, who were aware that consent decrees entered into by their employer in earlier litigation might affect them, but who chose not to intervene were entitled
to litigate the issue in a new action); compare § 112, 105 Stat. at 1078-79 (stating that "an
unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been
adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose . . . when the seniority system is
adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person
aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system") with Lorance v. AT&T
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civil rights protections,"" and that legislation was necessary to provide additional protection against employment discrimination. 5
The Act now allows a plaintiff claiming intentional employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 to
recover compensatory and punitive damages against his or her employer.7 Additionally, a plaintiff may also demand a jury trial.8
Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1989) (holding that "when a seniority system is
nondiscriminatory in form and application, it is the allegedly discriminatory adoption
which triggers the limitations period"). For a thorough discussion of the congressional
response to all of these cases, see Sondra Hemeryck et al., Reconstruction, Deconstruction
and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of
1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1990).
The 1991 Act also overruled two 1991 Supreme Court decisions. Section 109, which
extends protection under Title VII to U.S. citizens in foreign countries, overruled EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991) ("[p]etitioners have failed to
present sufficient affirmative evidence that Congress intended Title VII to apply
abroad."). Section 113 overruled West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 111 S.
Ct. 1138 (1991), by authorizing recovery of reasonable expert witness fees by prevailing
parties. See 137 CONG. REc. H9539 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Clay);
see also infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 109 and 402).
4. § 2(2), 105 Stat. at 1071.
5. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. The stated purposes of the Act, which amended the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, were:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful
harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and
in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C 2000e et seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope
of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
7. § 102(b), 105 Stat. at 1072-73. This section provides:
Sec. 102. DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION.
The Revised Statutes are amended by inserting after section 1977 (42 U.S.C.
1981) the following new section:
Sec. 1977A. DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT....
(b) COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES.(1) DETERMINATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.-A complaining
party may recover punitive damages under this section against a
respondent (other than a government, government agency or
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that
the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
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These new provisions supplement the remedies, such as backpay
and injunctive relief, that were already available to a claimant
under the statute. 9
Though Congress specifically identified each of the new rights
and remedies available to a claimant under the Act, it failed to
identify with any clarity the universe of claimants affected by these
new provisions. Congress never stated whether the new provisions
should be applied to lawsuits that were pending on November 21,
1991, the Act's effective date. Consequently, following the enactment of the new remedial provisions, many plaintiffs amended
their complaints under the 1991 Act to seek damages that were not
previously available." Lacking clear guidance on this point, individual courts have struggled with the issue of the Act's applicability to specific plaintiffs, reaching conclusions that are simply
irreconcilable as a body of law."'
Accordingly, this Comment examines the doctrine of retroactivity,12 focusing on the application of a newly-enacted statute to
Id.
8. § 102(c), 105 Stat. at 1073. This section provides in pertinent part:
(c) Jury Trial.-If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section(1) any party may demand a trial by jury ....
Id.
9. § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. at 1072. Section 102 provides:

(a)

RIGHT OF RECOVERY.-

(1) CIVIL RIGHTS.-In an action brought by a complaining party under
section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5)
against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination
(not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act (42 U.S.C.
2000e-2 or 2000e-3), and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981), the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.

Id.
10. Because the 1991 Act contains specific sections that legislatively overrule previous Supreme Court decisions (see supra note 3) plaintiffs have argued that they should be
allowed to proceed under the new Act even though, under prior Supreme Court precedent, their claims may have been barred. See also infra sec. III.A and III.B.
11. See infra secs. III.A and III.B.
12. A distinction between "retroactive" and "retrospective" statutes has been observed by courts and commentators. "Retroactive" refers to legislative action that determines the "legal significance of acts or events that have occurred prior to the date... of
enactment." Gregory J. DeMars, Retrospectivity and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation Reconsidered, 10 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 253, 255-56 (1983). Thus, a "retroactive" statute, in
the pure sense of the term, voids, affirms, or modifies prior law. Id. at 255. On the other
hand, the term "retrospective" indicates "new legal significance from [the statute's] effective date to pre-enactment events or facts." Id. Despite the distinction, the term "retro-
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(1) cases pending on the statute's enactment date and (2) conduct
occurring before that same date. The Comment begins by discussing the effective date provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
the Act's legislative history. Next, it reviews two conflicting lines
of Supreme Court precedent regarding the retroactivity of statutes.
Against this background, the Comment focuses on the inconsistent
interpretation and application of the 1991 Act, summarizing many
recent lower court opinions, as well as the position taken by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency responsible for administration of employment discrimination claims. The
Comment then analyzes the two Supreme Court doctrines of retroactivity and suggests a preferred approach. The Comment proposes a temporary solution to the problem facing judges who are
called upon to decide the applicability of the Act: until either the
Supreme Court or Congress chooses to resolve the issue of the
Act's retroactivity, courts should strive to ensure fundamental fairness to the parties in every case that involves the Act.
II.

BACKGROUND

The logical starting point, in an analysis of the Act's applicability to cases pending on the date of enactment, is Section 402, the
Act's "effective date" provision. However, Section 402(a) states
only that the Act and its amendments take effect upon enactment. 3 As one appellate panel noted, this provision can sustain
several logical interpretations: a court may conclude that the Act
applies to (1) conduct that occurred after November 21, 1991,
(2) complaints filed after that date, (3) complaints amended after
that date, or (4) appeals taken after that date. " A court may also
active" is freely used to describe either situation. Id. at 256. Because this Comment
focuses on the application of a new statute to pending cases and to conduct that occurred
before the statute's enactment date, this author, too, will use the term "retroactive application" in this generic sense. For early analyses of the general prohibition against retroactivity, see Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231, 232
(1927) [hereinafter Smith I], and Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights II, 6
TEX. L. REV. 409 (1928) [hereinafter Smith II]. For discussion of constitutional' and
policy considerations, see W. David Slawson, Constitutionaland Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216 (1960), and Charles B. Hochman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 692 (1960).
13. § 402, 105 Stat. at 1099. Section 402 states:
Sec. 402. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except -as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and
the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment.
Id.
14. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 932-33 (7th Cir.
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decide that the provisions apply to cases that were pending on November 21, 1991, regardless of the stage of the proceedings.'"
When the plain language of a statute does not provide clear textual guidance, courts often examine an act's legislative history to
determine Congress's reasons for enacting the statute. 16 Courts

should exercise care, however, when relying on statements made
by legislators,"7 because it is difficult to know whether a specific
statement reflects congressional intent or merely the intent of the
individual lawmaker who read his or her remarks into the written
record. II

A.

Legislative History: Compromise Leads to Ambiguity

One year before it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
provided the framework for the new law by passing a similar bill.' 9
The 1990 bill contained language authorizing retroactive application of several provisions to cases pending at the time of enactment.2 ° President Bush vetoed the bill, criticizing, among other
1992) (noting that "[s]ection 402(a)'s language is hopelessly ambiguous ....
); see also
Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1992). The Luddington
court surmised that the statute could be applied:
(1) to cases filed and completed before the effective date of the statute that arise
from acts committed before that effective date, (2) to cases filed before the effective date of the statute, but not completed by that date, that arise from acts
committed before that date, (3) to cases filed after the effective date that arise
from acts committed before that date, (4) to cases in any of these categories but
in which the conduct complained of straddles the effective date of the statute,
or (5) only to cases filed after the effective date that arise from acts committed
entirely after that date.
Id. The court explained that the first four instances involved retroactivity, but the fifth
did not. Id.
15. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 932.
16. See, e.g., Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (citing Illinois EPA v. United States EPA, 947 F.2d 283, 290 (7th Cir. 1991)). No
legislative committee reports exist regarding S. 1745. Therefore, the floor debates provide
the only available legislative history. Accordingly, the legislative history is exclusively
found in the Congressional Record. See discussion infra sec. II.A.
17. Sofferin, 785 F. Supp. at 785 (citing Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984)).
18. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 933-34; see also Steinle v. Boeing Co., 785 F. Supp. 1434, 1439
(D. Kan. 1992).
19. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). For a general discussion of the 1990 bill
and its subsequent defeat, see Cynthia L. Alexander, Comment, The Defeat of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 595 (1991).
20. S. 2104, § 15(a). The Act provided that specified sections "shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after" specified dates. S. 2104, § 15(a)(l)-(6); see also
Mozee, 963 F.2d at 933 (finding that "the 1990 proposal contains explicit language that
would have required courts to apply many of its provisions to cases pending at the time of
its enactment").
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things, its "unfair retroactivity rules."' 2' In an apparent compromise designed to obtain the approval of the President, Congress
passed a revised bill in 1991,22 which did not include the controversial retroactivity provisions.23 President Bush signed the 1991 bill
into law on November 21, 1991.24
The floor debates that preceded the passage of the Act indicated
that the members of Congress could not agree on whether the Act
should apply retroactively. 25 Not even the principal sponsors of
the Act could agree on the issue of its retroactivity. 26 In the Interpretive Memorandum issued by Senators Danforth and Kennedy,
Senator Danforth stated that the Act should be applied prospectively in the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary.27 In
contrast, Senator Kennedy favored retroactivity and believed that
courts should apply the Act's provisions to pending cases.28
Other congressmen also submitted statements of their views on
retroactivity, 29 but there was no congressional consensus on the issue. Because it is inconclusive, the legislative history provides no
guidance for interpreting the Act.3 ° Interestingly, leaders from
21. 136 CONG. REC. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990); Fray v. Omaha World Herald
Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1375 (8th Cir. 1992). Congress failed to override the veto. Fray, 960
F.2d at 1375.
22. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
23. 137 CONG. REC. S15503-12 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
24. See supra note 2.
25. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
26. The principal sponsors of the Act were Senators Kennedy and Danforth. See
infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
27. 137 CONG. REC. S15483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
28. 137 CONG. REC. S15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) ("[o]rdinarily, courts... apply
newly enacted procedures and remedies to pending cases.").
29. See 137 CONG. REc. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) for a section-bysection analysis and the views of Senators Dole, Bums, Cochran, Gan, Gorton,
Grassley, Hatch, Mack, McCain, McConnell, Murkowski, Simpson, Seymour and Thurmond, advocating a prospective approach. For further support of a prospective approach, see 137 CONG. REC. S 17685 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (colloquy between Senators
Levin and Rudman); 137 CONG. REC. H9542, H9548-49 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde); and 137 CONG. REC. S15483, S15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Danforth). Additional support for a retroactive approach is found in
137 CONG. REC. H9549 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fish); 137 CONG.
REC. H9526, H9530-31 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards); and 137
CONG. REC. S15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
30. The three federal courts of appeals that have addressed the issue concluded that
the legislative history provides no guidance whatsoever. See Luddington, 966 F.2d at 227
(stating that because the proponents of prospectivity and retroactivity could not reach an
accommodation, they "dumped the question in the judiciary's lap without guidance");
Mozee, 963 F.2d at 932 (concluding that "whether Congress intended prospective or retroactive application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act cannot be deciphered from either the
language of the statute or from the legislative history"); Fray, 960 F.2d at 1377 (commenting that both proponents and opponents of retroactivity were "willing to hand this
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both sides of the issue agreed that the judiciary should determine
whether and to what extent the Act applies to cases and claims
pending on the date of enactment. 3 1 Despite their agreement on
this point, these legislators remained divided on the question of
how the courts should resolve the issue.32
Looking beyond the Act's inconclusive legislative history for
guidance on the retroactivity issue, some courts have focused on
the remarks made by President Bush as he signed the bill into
law.
The President indicated that Senator Dole's statements,
which urged prospective application of the Act, would guide the
executive branch in its interpretation of the new law.34
Advocates of retroactive application contend, on the other hand,
that two provisions of the Act, Sections 109(c) and 402(b), offer
support for their position.35 They argue that by including these
controversial issue to the judiciary by passing a law that contained no general resolution
of the retroactivity issue"); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992)
(determining that the legislative history provides no guidance on this issue).
The frustration in the federal district courts is also apparent. See infra sec. III.B; see
also, e.g., Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325, 328 n.3
(D.D.C. 1992) (finding the legislative history "unhelpful"); King v. Shelby Medical Ctr.,
779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (noting that "Congress ...punted on the question of
whether or not the Act applies retroactively").
31. See 137 CONG. REC. S15963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
32. See supra note 29; see also infra secs. II.B. 1 and II.B.2, and the discussion of the
two conflicting approaches set forth by the Supreme Court in Bradley v. School Bd. of
City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), and Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204 (1988).
33. See President's Statement, supra note 2; see, e.g., Sofferin, 785 F. Supp. at 784.
34. See President's Statement, supra note 2; Sofferin, 785 F. Supp. at 785; 137 CONG.
REC. S15953 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30,
1991).
35. § 109(c), 105 Stat. at 1077-78. Section 109(c) provides:
Sec. 109. PROTECTION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT.
(c) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the
enactment of this Act.
Section 402(b), 105 Stat. at 1099, provides:
Sec. 402. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(b) CERTAIN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.-Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case
for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.
These provisions were added in response to two Supreme Court decisions. Section 109
was added to legislatively overrule EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227
(1991), by extending protections under Title VII to U.S. citizens employed in foreign
countries. Section 402(b) was added to prevent any possible retroactive application of the
Act to the litigation in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), in
which Wards Cove Packing Co. had spent twenty-four years defending a disparate impact charge. See 137 CONG. REC. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
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sections, which expressly provide for prospective-only application,
Congress intended the rest of the Act to apply retroactively. a6
When examined as a whole, however, the legislative history does
not support this result.3 7 The floor debates suggest that Congress
intended to draft narrow provisions that would apply only to a
handful of Supreme Court decisions.3 8 Indeed, it is the Act's legislative history that has generated most of the confusion regarding
retroactivity.
B.

Supreme Court Decisions on Retroactive Application of
Statutes

A basic rule of statutory construction provides that when congressional intent regarding retroactive application of a new statute
is expressed, that intent governs. 39 Because both the language of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act and its legislative history are ambiguous,
however, courts that have addressed the issue of the Act's retroactivity have had to rely on Supreme Court analysis for guidance.
The Supreme Court, however, has taken two distinct approaches in
its cases involving retroactivity. One view, the Thorpe-Bradley approach, is based on the Court's decisions in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,4° and Bradley v. School Board of Richmond.41
According to the Thorpe-Bradley line of decisions, in the absence
of clear congressional intent, a statute should be applied retroactively unless that application would result in "manifest injustice."42
Dole) (noting that "[s]ection 402(b) specifically points out that nothing in the Act will
apply retroactively to the Wards Cove Packing Company."); see also 137 CONG. REC.
S15963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (indicating that Sec. 402(b)
was intended solely to protect Wards Cove Packing Co. from retroactive application of
the Act to its protracted litigation); 137 CONG. REc. S15953 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Murkowski, drafter of Sec. 402(b)) (claiming that the 1990 Act was to
"apply retroactively to all cases pending on the date of enactment, regardless of the age of
the case" and that his proposed amendment intended to limit retroactive application of
the Act regarding Wards Cove); see also supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., 137 CONG. H9526, H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Edwards). Whereas sections 402(b) and 109(c) "express a clear purpose to deny retroactive application in the circumstances set forth, [Congress'] decision not to use similar
language in Sec. 402(a) clearly shows [a] different purpose in all other circumstances."
Id.
37. See supra note 30.
38. See supra note 36.
39. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990)
(stating that under either line of precedent with respect to retroactivity, "where congressional intent is clear, it governs").
40. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
41. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
42. See Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 282; Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
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In contrast, Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital 3 held that a
statute is presumed to apply prospectively unless Congress has
clearly indicated otherwise."
1. The Thorpe-Bradley Doctrine
In Thorpe, the Court ordered retroactive application of the statute at issue, stating that a court is required to apply the law that is
in effect at the time it issues a decision. 45 The Bradley Court extended this reasoning, concluding that a new law should apply retroactively to pending cases unless that application would (1) result
46
in a manifest injustice or (2) contradict a clear legislative intent.
In Thorpe, the petitioner, a tenant in a low-income housing project operated by the city of Durham, appealed an eviction order
following the termination of her lease by the city. 47 Though she
had asked repeatedly, the city never told her why she was being
evicted. 4 Nevertheless, the trial court ordered her to leave the
premises, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed that
decision.49 Petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, and while her appeal was pending, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular requiring local housing authorities to inform any soon-to-be
evicted tenant of the impending eviction and to explain the reasons
for the eviction to that tenant. 50 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated
the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the HUD circular.51 On remand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to
apply the new rule and re-affirmed the eviction.52
Thorpe appealed the decision, and the United States Supreme
43. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
44. Id. at 208.
45. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 281-82.
46. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
47. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 271. The tenant had been elected president of the tenants'
organization, and the next day, the city terminated her lease. Id. She refused to vacate
the apartment, and the city began eviction proceedings. Id.
48. Housing Auth. of Durham v. Thorpe, 148 S.E.2d 290, 292 (N.C. 1966).
49. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 271-72.
50. Id., 393 U.S. at 272-73. Furthermore, the regulation also required the local authorities to respond to tenants' inquiries. Id.
51. Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 386 U.S. 620, 673-74 (1967).
52. Housing Auth. of Durham v. Thorpe, 157 S.E.2d 147, 150 (N.C. 1967). The
court reasoned that since all of the critical events occurred before the effective date of the
HUD circular, including the decision to terminate the lease, the circular could not be
given retroactive effect. Id. The court held that the directive had no application to the
facts of the case. Id.
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Court reversed, concluding that the state supreme court erred
when it refused to apply the new regulation to Thorpe's case-even
though the regulation was not on the books when Thorpe was
evicted. 3 The Court stated that the HUD regulation, when applied to Thorpe's case, would offer the tenant additional constitutional protection, but create no hardship or injustice for the
housing authority, which had fully complied with the regulation in
all subsequent cases.54 Because the housing authority would suffer
no injustice or hardship by offering Thorpe an explanation for her
eviction, the Court concluded that the regulation should be applied
retroactively.5
In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,56 the Supreme Court
extended its decision in Thorpe and concluded that a court could
apply a new law retroactively even if there was no clear congressional intent to that effect.57 The Bradley plaintiffs, parents of children in the Richmond, Virginia school system, sought an award of
attorneys' fees and expenses following successful desegregation litigation. 5 Though there was no statutory authorization for awarding attorneys' fees in a desegregation case, the district court
invoked its general equitable powers and granted the petitioners'
request.5 9 The appellate court reversed, citing, inter alia, Congress'
failure to specifically provide for this type of an award in a desegregation case.6
While the case was pending on appeal, Congress amended Section 718 of Title VII of the Emergency School Act 6' to provide for
awards of attorneys' fees in appropriate school desegregation
53. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 274. The Court relied upon Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801): "[I]f subsequent to the
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed or its obligation denied. If the
law be constitutional.... I know of no court which can contest its obligation." Thorpe,
393 U.S. at 282 (quoting Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110).
54. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 283. The housing authority admitted that it complied with
the notice provisions once the rule took effect, but had refused to apply the regulation to
Thorpe only because the regulation had not been in effect at the time of the initial proceeding. Id.
55. Id.
56. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
57. Id. at 715.
58. Id. at 705.
59. Id. at 705-06. The district court noted that other sections of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act provided for awards of attorneys' fees and concluded that awards were justified in desegregation cases as well. Id. at 706-08.
60. Id. at 708-10.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. IT 1970).
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cases. 62 Though the appellate court considered applying the
amendment to petitioners' claim, it ultimately concluded that the
section was inapplicable.63 The court stated that the attorneys had
completed their work before the amendment was enacted and had
no orders pending or appealable at the time the district court approved the award.6 Petitioners appealed this decision.
Relying on Thorpe, the Supreme Court in Bradley stated that a
court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision unless
a manifest injustice would result or clear congressional intent
would demand otherwise. 65 The Bradley Court concluded that
Thorpe does not compel a court to apply a new law retroactively
when the law itself does not explicitly require that result.66 Because the legislative history of Section 718 contained support for
either interpretation,67 the Bradley Court held that there was at
least implicit approval for applying the statute to pending cases.6 s
The Court cautioned, however, that its decision should not be construed as holding that courts must apply new laws to pending cases
in the absence of a clear legislative directive to the contrary.69
The Court then discussed Thorpe's manifest injustice exception. 70 Reviewing prior cases, the Bradley Court noted that none
of the decisions had spelled out with any specificity the elements
needed to trigger the exception. 71 Nevertheless, the Court an62. Id
63. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 708-09.
64. Id. at 709-10.
65. Id. at 711. The Court stated: "We anchor our holding in this case on the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing
so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to
the contrary." Id. The Court also discussed the state of the law following the Schooner
Peggy decision:
[It] remained unclear whether a change in the law occurring while a case was
pending on appeal was to be given effect only where, by its terms, the law was to
apply to pending cases .... or, conversely, whether such a change in the law
must be given effect unless there was clear indication that it was not to apply in
pending cases.
Id. at 712.
66. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 715 ("Thorpe thus stands for the proposition that even where
the intervening law does not explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases, it is
to be given recognition and effect."). The Court continued: "We must reject the contention that a change in the law is to be given effect in a pending case only where that is the
clear and stated intention of the legislature." Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. The Court noted the futile efforts of two lower courts to ascertain congressional intent from the legislative history. Id. at 716 n.22.
68. Id. at 716.
69. Id. at 715-16.
70. Id. at 716.
71. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717.
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nounced three factors that should be examined when determining
whether the retroactive application of a new law would produce an
unjust result: (1) the nature and identities of the parties; (2) the
nature of the parties' rights; and (3) thenature of the impact of the
change in law upon the parties' rights.72
Applying these factors, the Bradley Court concluded that no
manifest injustice would result by applying the statute retroactively.13 First, the Court noted that, even though private individuals had initiated the action, the subject matter was of "great
national concern" to the public.7 4 Second, the Court reasoned that
the School Board had no mature or unconditional right to use the
funds allocated to it by the taxpayers to run a segregated school
system contrary to public law.75 Third, the Court noted that the
new legislation did not alter the substantive rights of the parties.76
Even absent the new statutory provision, the Board was obligated
to provide the students with a non-discriminatory education.
Furthermore, the Board was fully aware that, under alternative
theories, it could have been required to pay attorneys' fees. 78 Thus,
the Bradley Court concluded that since the three prongs of the test
had been satisfied, no manifest injustice would result if the statute
were applied retroactively.79
2.

The Bowen Decision-Shifting Courses

Fourteen years later, the decision in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital10 marked a clear departure from the Thorpe-Bradley approach. Stating that "retroactivity is not favored in the law,"
the Bowen Court held that a statute should not be given retroactive
effect unless the statute explicitly requires this application or there
72. Id. For a discussion of the Bradley approach and the cases cited by the Court, see
William V. Luneberg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J.
106, 117 (1991) [hereinafter Luneberg].
73. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717-21.
74. Id. at 719. The Court recognized that school desegregation litigation differed
from "mere private cases" and concluded that this type of litigation deserved greater
attention than cases between individual litigants. Id.
75. Id. at 720. The Court noted earlier decisions where it had refused to apply a new
law to pending cases because such an action would "infringe upon or deprive a person of
a right that had matured or become unconditional." Id.
76. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 721.
77. Id.
78. Id. The alternative theories for recovery of attorneys' fees were discussed by the
district court and the court of appeals. Id.
79. Id.

80. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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is evidence of clear congressional intent to that effect. 8
In Bowen, the Court examined the propriety of retroactive
rulemaking by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 82 In
1981, the Secretary promulgated a regulation to revise the method
for calculating a key factor used to determine cost reimbursements
from the federal government to individual hospitals.8 3 After local
hospitals challenged the validity of the rule, citing the Secretary's
failure to provide appropriate notice and comment,84 the district
court declared the rule invalid. 5
Three years later, the Secretary published a notice for public
comment on a proposal to re-issue the 1981 regulation, retroactive
to 1981.86 Congress, in the interim, had amended the Medicare
Act by requiring new cost-reimbursement considerations.8 7 Following the comment period, the Secretary re-issued the 1981 rule
and attempted to recover the sum the Department had previously
paid pursuant to the district court's order. 88 The hospitals challenged the validity of the retroactive rule and prevailed on summary judgment in the district court.8 9 The appellate court
affirmed, noting that both the Administrative Procedure Act 9° and
the Medicare Act 9 prohibited this type of retroactive rulemaking. 92 The Secretary then petitioned the Supreme Court for review,
81. Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 205-08. For a discussion of Bowen and its effect on administrative regulations, see Luneberg, supra note 72, at 107, 114, in which the author suggests that the
Bowen approach has limited applicability.
83. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206-07. Pursuant to the Medicare Act, the Secretary had the
authority to promulgate cost-reimbursement regulations that placed limits on recoverable
costs under the federal Medicare program. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988). Providers
of health care services to individuals who qualified for Medicare benefits received reimbursements from the government for expenses incurred in the treatment of the beneficiaries. Id.
84. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206. The Administrative Procedure Act requires an agency to
provide notice and a public comment period before issuing a rule. 5 U.S.C § 551 et seq.
(1988).
85. Id. at 206.
86. Id. at 207.
87. Id.
88. Id. "In effect, the Secretary had promulgated a rule retroactively, and the net
result was as if the original rule had never been set aside." Id. The rule required the
respondents, a group of seven hospitals, to return reimbursement payments in excess of
$2 million. Id.
89. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 207-08. The district court concluded that retroactive application was not justified. Id.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
92. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 750, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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and the Court also affirmed. 93
The Court began its analysis by stating that unless expressly required, congressional enactments and administrative rules are not
to be given retroactive effect. 94 In the context of administrative
law, the Court stated that a statute conferring rulemaking authority does not confer power to promulgate retroactive rules unless its
terms explicitly so provide.95 Although the Medicare Act specifically addressed and permitted retroactive action in some instances,
the Court concluded that the reimbursement rules at issue should
not be applied retroactively.96 In addition, the Court held that the
Act did not authorize retroactive rulemaking except in specific,
limited circumstances.97
Therefore, the Court concluded, where Congress intended retroactive rulemaking, it expressly provided for that power. 9 Moreover, the legislative history indicated that Congress unambiguously
intended to enact prospective cost-limit rules.99 Thus, because
neither the statutory language nor the legislative history provided
any support for retroactive rulemaking authority, the Court rejected that argument. 1°°
The Bowen Court did not analyze the Medicare Act provision
under the Thorpe-Bradley rule. The Court also did not reject the
Thorpe-Bradley approach."°' By leaving Thorpe-Bradley intact, the
Bowen Court presented a second approach to the issue of statutory
retroactivity-an approach that directly conflicted with its prior
decisions. The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this conflict.
93. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 207-08.
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id. The Court observed that even where there is justification for retroactive
rulemaking, courts should be reluctant to find such authority in a statute without an
express statutory grant. Id. at 208-09.
96. Id. at 209.
97. Id. The Court observed, however, that federal appellate courts analyzing the retroactivity of the provision had reached different results. Id. at 209 n. 1.
98. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 213.
99. Id. at 214. The legislative history directly addressed the question of retroactivity.
Id.
100. Id. at 215. Thus, the court declared the reinstatement of the initial rule invalid.
Id. at 216.
101. In fact, the Bowen Court did not cite to Thorpe or Bradley anywhere in the
majority or concurring opinions. The Court's opinion rested on administrative law principles, the language of the statute and its legislative history. Therefore, in instances such
as those that involve the 1991 Civil Rights Act, where the statutory language and legislative history are not clear, reliance on Bowen is misplaced. See infra secs. IV and V.
Nevertheless, all of the courts that have analyzed the issue of retroactivity of the 1991
Act have discussed both the Thorpe-Bradley and Bowen doctrines as opposing approaches. See infra secs. III.A. and III.B.
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3.

Kaiser: Addressing, But Not Resolving, the Conflict

Although the decision in KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
Bonjorno10 2 did not resolve the conflict presented by Thorpe-Bradley and Bowen, lower courts regularly cite the opinion for its discussion and
recognition of the Supreme Court's divergent
0 3
doctrines. 1

In Kaiser, a group of antitrust plaintiffs who had prevailed at
trial sought to recover the postjudgment interest that had accrued
on their damages during a lengthy appeal process. 'I During the
appeal process, Congress modified the applicable postjudgment interest statute. 105 This modification changed the means by which
the postjudgment interest rate was to be calculated. 'I The plaintiffs wished to have the postjudgment
interest calculated at the
0 7
higher rate allowed by the statute.

Both the district court and the Third Circuit applied the Bradley
presumption that courts are to apply the law in effect at the time a
court renders its decision unless such application results in manifest injustice or runs counter to congressional intent.108 Neither
court found conclusive congressional intent. ,09 However, while the
district court found that the application of the amended statute
would result in manifest injustice, the Third Circuit disagreed and
held that the statute should be applied retroactively.110 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. "'
102. 494 U.S. 827 (1990). For a discussion of Kaiser and its relation to Bradley and
Bowen, see Daniel J. Capra, Discretion Must Be Controlled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed, Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme Court Contributions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 MD. L. REv. 632,
704 (1991).
103. See infra secs. III.A and III.B and cases cited therein. All of the courts cite to
Kaiser, and especially to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, to emphasize the confusion
generated by the Supreme Court decisions.
104. Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 834.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976), as amended by The Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, § 302 (1982).
106. Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 831-32. Under the old law, interest was to be calculated at
the rate allowed by the law of the State in which the court sits. Id. Under the new law,
interest was to be calculated based upon the yield for United States Treasury Bills settled
immediately prior to the date of judgment. Id. Congress modified the law to remove any
economic incentive for a losing defendant to appeal a judgment in order to collect interest
on the sum owed to the plaintiff during the appeal process. Id. at 839.
107. Id. The Court considered whether the statute could be applied retroactively in
order to determine: (1) the applicable rate of interest; and (2) the date from which the
interest should be calculated. Id. at 829.
108. Id. at 832-33.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 833.
111. 491 U.S. 903 (1989).
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Though the Supreme Court acknowledged the confusion that its
previous holdings had generated, 1 2 it did not use the Kaisercase to
resolve the problem.a1 3 Because the language of the amended statute and its legislative history made it clear that the amended statute was not to be applied before its effective date, the Court was
able to resolve the Kaiser case without entangling itself in the
larger issue. 1 4 Basing its decision solely on the statute's unambiguous legislative intent, the Kaiser Court did not attempt to reconcile the two conflicting approaches. 5
III.

DISCUSSION

After President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into
law, many plaintiffs in pending cases filed motions to amend their
complaints. These plaintiffs either alleged new causes of action
under the Act or sought one of the Act's new remedies. 1 6 Though
some district courts granted these motions to amend, other courts
denied them. 1 7 This inconsistency typifies the divergent ap112. Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 837. The Court recognized the "apparent tension" between
the Bradley and Bowen views. Id.
113. Id. (reasoning that the conflict need not be addressed because, under either view,
clear congressional intent governs).
114. Id. at 837-38. Congress had delayed the effective date of the amendment by six
months in order to familiarize courts with the change in law. In addition, the terms of
the Senate committee report on the legislation indicate that the amended statute was not
to be applied before the enactment date. Id. at 839.
115. Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 839-40. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia found the
Bradley and Bowen views "in irreconcilable contradiction" and would have held that
Thorpe and Bradley were "wrong." Id. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring). In addition, he
would have settled the issue by holding that, in the absence of specific authorization to
the contrary, legislation operates prospectively only. Id. Justice Scalia then pointed to
pre-Thorpe decisions in which the Court determined that, as a general rule, laws should
not operate retroactively: "During the more than 150 years of doctrinal certainty, we did
not always deny retroactive application to new statutory law. But when we accorded it,
the reason was that the statute affirmatively so required." Id. at 843-44 (emphasis added). For a historical perspective, see Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive
Legislation:A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936); see also
Smith I and Smith II, supra note 12; DeMars, supra note 12 (noting the general prohibition against retroactivity).
Kaiser was a 5-4 decision. The dissenters contended that the "plain language" of the
statute did not address the applicability of the amended statute to pending cases. Kaiser,
494 U.S. at 864 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.).
They also maintained that the case did not involve retroactivity at all, because the change
in law did not create the possibility of overturning a final decision. Id. Furthermore,
applying the amended statute did not result in altering legal consequences for past actions. Id. at 866. By applying the manifest injustice exception, a fair result could be
obtained without applying a mechanical presumption against retroactivity. Id. at 866-69.
116. See infra secs. III.A and III.B and cases cited therein.
117. See infra note 187.
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proaches taken by courts that have been asked to decide whether
the Act applies retroactively to plaintiffs whose cases were pending
on November 21, 1991. These courts have disagreed on the meaning of Section 402(a), its ambiguous legislative history, and the correct interpretation of conflicting Supreme Court precedent.' 1 8 To
date, three federal appellate courts have agreed that the Act should
not be applied retroactively." 9 Taken together, the results are interesting; these courts read the same statute, analyzed the same
legislative history, and studied the same Supreme Court decisions,
yet they reached different conclusions.
A.

The Decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals

Three federal appellate courts have ruled against retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Like the district courts,
each recognized the difficulty of resolving the issue in view of the
ambiguous language of the statute, its inconclusive legislative history, and the conflicting Supreme Court decisions on the issue.
In Vogel v. Cincinnati,20 the appellant challenged the city's affirmative action policy with respect to hiring and promotions
within the police department.' 2 ' Even though the parties did not
argue the applicability of the Act, the Sixth Circuit, sua sponte,
22
addressed the issue and concluded that the Act did not apply.
After acknowledging that the legislative history provided no guidance, 23 the court considered the Bradley-Bowen dichotomy. The
court recognized that it had frequently cited Bradley as controlling, 24 but concluded that Bradley should be read narrowly and
118. The courts agree only that the legislative history is ambiguous and the Supreme
Court decisions are in conflict. See infra secs. III.A and III.B and cases cited therein.
119. See discussion infra sec. III.A.
120. 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992).
121. This case was argued before the Sixth Circuit on November 5, 1991-sixteen
days before the Act took effect. The appellant did not present subsequent arguments
under the 1991 Act, but rather appealed entry of summary judgment for the city. Id. at
597. The city and the Department of Justice had entered into a consent decree following
charges that the city engaged in discriminatory hiring and promotion practices against
blacks and women in violation of Title VII. Id. at 596. The consent decree called for the
city to hire and promote individuals, giving preference to blacks and women in order to
meet specified percentages. Id. When Vogel, a white male, was not promoted he filed an
action for damages, alleging that the city had exceeded its authority under the consent
decree, or alternatively, that the affirmative action policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
entry of summary judgment for the city. Id.
122. Id. at 597 (holding that "the 1991 Act does not govern the instant case, which
involves conduct that occurred before the 1991 Act became law").
123. Id. at 598.
124. Id. The court stated that in a previous case, there had been a "choice between
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not applied in situations where "substantive rights and liabilities"
would be affected.125 Apparently finding that this danger was present in the case at bar, the court held that the Act should not apply
retroactively. 126
The Eighth Circuit in Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co. 127 also
refused to apply the Act retroactively. The court held that Section
101(2)(b) of the Act, 128 enacted while the case was on appeal,
should not be applied retroactively.' 29 The appellant, a black woman, worked part-time in appellee's mailroom and had applied for
a full-time mailroom apprentice position. 3 ° Appellee, however, offered the apprentice position to a white male truck driver who had
the broad statement of the law in Bradley and the recent affirmation in Bowen of the
general rule against retrospective application." Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 937
F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991)).
125. Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598. The court indicated that the phrase, "substantive rights
and liabilities," should be broadly construed. Id. (quoting Murphy, 937 F.2d at 1037-38).
126. Id. The court did not explain its finding, but stated merely that, "[c]learly, retroactive application of the 1991 Act would affect 'substantial rights and liabilities' of the
parties." Id. One judge dissented because the issue of retroactivity had not been raised
before the court. Id. at 601 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
127. 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
128. This section was added to legislatively overrule the Supreme Court's decision in
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), which construed 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 as limited to claims involving a "refusal to enter into an employment contract on
the basis of race." See Fray, 960 F.2d at 1372 (citing Patterson, 491 U.S. at 182). In
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 195, the Court found that a denied promotion was not covered
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 unless the opportunity involved entering into a "new" contract
with the employer, or creating a "new and distinct" relationship between the employer
and the employee. Furthermore, the Patterson Court held that the claim must be based
on a promotion that involved a "meaningful, qualitative change" in the employment contract. Id. For a detailed discussion of Patterson and the congressional response that it
generated, see Hemeryck, supra note 3; see also B. Glenn George, Employment Discrimination Under Section 1981: Post-PattersonUpdate and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, ALIABA Course of Study, Advanced Employment Law and Litigation (American Law Institute), C669 ALI-ABA 295 (Dec. 5, 1991) (discussing Patterson and the 1991 Act).
129. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1373-74. The appellant filed this action in 1987 against her
employer for alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred between 1984 and 1986. Id.
at 1372. The Supreme Court decided Patterson in 1989, before appellant's case initially
went to trial. Thus, the appellant argued that the Act overruled Patterson,which had not
been the law at the time the conduct occurred, and therefore, that Patterson should not
apply at all. Id. at 1371.
The court acknowledged that if it were to hold in favor of retroactive application, the
appellant would be allowed to proceed, since Sec. 101(2)(b) legislatively overruled the
Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (see supra note 128),
which would otherwise have precluded her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 1373.
If, on the other hand, the court were to find against retroactive application of Sec.
101(2)(b), then Patterson would control, and the appellant would not have an actionable
claim. Id. The Eighth Circuit decided against retroactivity of the Act and concluded
that Patterson precluded the appellant's failure-to-promote claim. Id.
130. Id. at 1371.

1992]

Retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights Act

no mailroom experience.' 31 Appellant filed a claim against the employer alleging sex and race discrimination in violation of federal
and state laws. 3 2 The district court entered a judgment in favor of
the appellant based on her Section 1981 and Title VII claims, but
only awarded damages for the Section 1981 violations.'
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by stating the "well-established principle" against retroactivity in general. 3 4 The court then
noted that Thorpe and Bradley destabilized this settled doctrine.135
The court stated that the Bowen decision, which contained no references to either Thorpe or Bradley, marked a return to traditional
principles against retroactivity.' 36 Moreover, according to the
court, the recent decision in Kaiser dealt a strong blow to the advocates of retroactivity.' 3 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged
that both approaches require courts to defer to clear legislative intent.' 38 Recognizing that Section 402(a), the statute's effective date
provision, did not resolve the issue, the court examined the legislative history, but found no guidance there.' 39 The appellant had
argued that the inclusion of two prospective-only provisions, Sections 109(c) and 402(b), 1' indicated that Congress intended the
rest of the Act to apply retroactively. The court, however, rejected
this argument, stating
that nothing in the legislative history sug4
gested that result.1

1

The court then discussed whether Section 101, specifically,
should be applied retroactively.' 42 Noting both Bowen's presump131. Id. at 1372.
132. Id. The appellant filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e
(Title VII) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-148. Id. at 1372 n.2.
133. Id. at 1372. Both parties appealed. Id.
134. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1374. The Court stated that "legislation must be addressed to
the future, not to the past . . . [and] a retrospective operation will not be given to a
statute which interferes with antecedent ights... unless such be 'the unequivocal and
inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. U.S., 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964)). The court also adopted the principle of
"ancient Roman civil law" that legislation requires a prospective application unless
otherwise specifically stated. Id.
135. Id. at 1374-75.
136. Id. "[A] unanimous Court restated the traditional principle without even citing
Bradley or Thorpe: 'Retroactivity is not favored in the law.'" Id. (quoting Bowen, 488
U.S. at 208).
137. Id. (citing Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 844-57).
138. Id. at 1375.
139. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1375-77.
140. Id. at 1377; see also supra note 35.
141. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1377. The court also found that although Congress responds
to a Supreme Court decision with a legislative change in law, it does not necessarily
follow that the new law is to be applied retroactively. Id.
142. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

tion against retroactivity as well as the absence of congressional
intent to the contrary, the court concluded
that Bowen barred ret43
roactive application of Section 101.
The court then discussed the Bradley test and concluded that the
manifest injustice exception did not apply. 144 The court also emphasized the history of the 1991 Act. The President had vetoed the
1990 bill, which contained retroactive provisions, and an attempt
to override his veto failed.' 45 The President ultimately signed the
revised bill, which did not contain the retroactive provisions.'4
The court concluded that the history of the 1991 Act established
a
4
legislative intent against retroactive application of the Act. 1
In dissent, Judge Heaney argued that the Act should be applied
retroactively, 4 ' and he criticized the majority's conclusion that
Congress intended prospective-only application. 149 Though Judge
Heaney agreed that a Bowen analysis did not require retroactive
application of the 1991 Act, he contended that a Bradley analysis
demanded this result. 50 In addition, because both approaches
were good law, Judge Heaney suggested that the court's overriding
143. Id. Consequently, the court found it "clear" that, pursuant to the Bowen presumption against retroactivity, "Pattersonhas not been retroactively overruled." Id. The
court based its reasoning on the fact that, while the 1990 bill specifically provided that the
Act would apply to all cases pending on the date of the Patterson decision, the 1991 bill
deleted that provision. Id. Furthermore, other retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill
had been deleted from the final 1991 version in an attempt to present a bill that would
meet with presidential approval. Id.
144. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1378. The court acknowledged that "[i]f the Bradley test applies, the retroactivity question is much closer." Id. Because the conduct occurred
before Patterson, the court concluded that the acts could be actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 as written at that time. Id. Consequently, applying the statute retroactively
would have had no effect on the rights and expectations of the parties. Id.
145. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
146. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1378.
147. Id. The court concluded that because the first bill proposing retroactivity failed
and a second bill deleting the provisions was enacted, the new law should be applied
prospectively only. Id. (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 48.04 (5th ed. 1992)).
148. Id. at 1379. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the court's
holding that the promotion in this case did not constitute a "new and distinct" employment relationship under Patterson. Id.; see also supra note 129.
149. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1379 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Consequently, the dissent argued that the majority erred when it concluded that the fact that a compromise version of
the Act was passed was dispositive of the retroactivity question. Id. According to the
dissent, the only certain conclusion was that Congress left it to the courts to decide the
issue. Id.
150. Id. According to the dissent, under Bradley, in the absence of intent to the
contrary, courts will apply a law retroactively to a pending case unless manifest injustice
would result. Id. The dissent pointed out that, as even the majority had recognized,
applying Section 101 to this case would not alter the positions of the parties. Id. at 1380.
Therefore, no manifest injustice would occur if the section were applied. Id. Thus, con-
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concern should be to ensure fairness to the parties involved in the
dispute. '5I
In Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co.,"3 2 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that the Act
should not apply retroactively. In Mozee, each party filed a petition
for rehearing, both of which were pending before the court at the
time the Act was enacted. 15 3 The court addressed two questions:
whether the Act should apply retroactively on appeal, and whether
54 It answered no to both questions. 155
it should apply on remand. 1
After concluding that the language of Section 402(a) is "hopelessly ambiguous," the Mozee court discussed the Act's legislative
history. 156 The court then noted the conflicting lines of Supreme
Court precedent regarding retroactivity, but stated that it was not
the province
of a lower court to resolve the Supreme Court's con57
flicts.

Instead, the court attempted to reconcile the Thorpe-

Bradley doctrine with the opposing view of Bowen.' 58
The court concluded that Bowen's presumption against retroactrary to the majority's assertion, the dissent found that the different approaches yielded
different results. Id. at 1380-81.
151. Id. at 1381. Because both Bradley and Bowen remain viable precedent, the dissent believed the court should have attempted to reconcile the doctrines to the extent
possible. Id. at 1380. The dissent found principles of fairness in both decisions. Id. at
1380-81. First, Bradley explicitly provides for the "manifest injustice" exception to retroactivity. Id. at 1381. While Bowen has no such explicit corresponding language, the
historical principles on which it is based suggest that the law denies retroactivity when
such an application would interfere with a party's expectations or matured rights. Id.
Consequently, because the three factors enunciated in Bradley lead to the conclusion
that no injustice would result from the retroactive application of Section 101 to this case,
the Act should have been applied. Id. at 1381-82. The dissent observed that because the
appellant brought suit before the Patterson decision, the employer had sufficient notice of
an actionable claim. Id.
152. 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992). In the original action, filed in 1977, a group of
black employees alleged racial discrimination by their employer under Title VII. Id. The
district court found for the employer, but the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision and
remanded to the district court "because the initial findings of fact were insufficient to
permit meaningful appellate review." Id. at 931. On remand, the district court found the
employer liable under Title VII. Id. Both the employees and the employer filed motions
for rehearing. Id. While the motions were pending, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Id. Consequently, the question in Mozee centered on the application of the
Act to the actions that occurred in 1977. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 940.
156. Id. at 933. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the inclusion of
two prospective-only provisions gave rise to an inference that Congress intended the remainder of the Act to apply retroactively. Id. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
157. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 935 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
158. Id. at 935 ("We are left with the difficult task of reconciling the Thorpe-Bradley
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tivity should apply in almost every case involving an ambiguouslyworded statute. 59 Thorpe-Bradley, the court continued, controls
only when retroactive application of a statute would not "infringe
upon or deprive a person of a right that had matured or become
unconditional. ' ' 16°
Having decided that the Bowen rule applies at any point during a
proceeding when substantive rights could be affected by retroactive
application of substantive provisions of a law, the court next considered whether the procedural and remedial provisions of the Act
should be applied retroactively on appeal.1 6 ' Because Thorpe and
Bradley presented "unique" situations, 62 and because retroactive
application of the provisions in those cases did not require a party
to re-litigate the issues, the court determined that the Bowen presumption also applies to procedural provisions on appeal. 6a The
court noted that, in most cases, retroactive application of a procedural provision would result in a new trial, causing the parties to
64
incur significant legal costs in re-litigating the same controversy.1
In those instances, Thorpe-Bradley's manifest injustice standard
and Bowen lines of cases in a manner that comports with the policies underlying the need
for prospective versus retroactive application.").
159. Id. at 935-36. The court cited Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Kaiser in
which he observed that the presumption against retroactivity found support in history
and tradition. Id. at 935 (citing Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring)). The
court also noted that Bowen reinforced the traditional rule. Id. at 935-36.
160. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 936 (citing Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985)). For
a discussion of retroactive laws and vested rights, see Smith I and Smith II, supra note 12.
The court turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Bennett for guidance. Mozee, 963
F.2d at 936. The Bennett court held Thorpe-Bradleyinapplicable where retroactive application of a law infringes upon or deprives a person of a matured or unconditional right.
Bennett, 470 U.S. at 639. Moreover, Bennett proposed that statutes affecting substantive
rights and liabilities "are presumed to have only prospective effect." Id. Therefore,
under the principles of fairness, Bennett guarantees that parties are held responsible only
under the substantive laws in existence at the time their relevant conduct occurred. Id.
161. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 936. The plaintiffs argued that the following provisions were
potentially applicable: Sections 101(b) (making and enforcing contracts in § 1981
claims); 104 and 105 (raising the business necessity defense for disparate impact cases
under Title VII); and 102 (expanding the remedies available for intentional discrimination claims under Title VII to include compensatory and punitive damages). Id. at 931.
162. Id. at 937. The Mozee court interpreted the Thorpe opinion to indicate that
requiring the housing authority to follow the regulations did not require it to incur any
additional expenses or hardships. Id. (discussing Thorpe, 393 U.S. 268). In addition, the
Mozee court believed that in Bradley, the imposition of attorneys' fees did not require the
parties to re-litigate claims under different laws or to start proceedings over. Id. at 93738 (discussing Bradley, 416 U.S. 696).
163. Id. at 937.
164. Id. The court confined its position to apply only to instances in which "the
parties have already litigated the issues." Id.
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would bar retroactive application of the law. 165
Next, the Mozee court examined whether the Act should apply
retroactively on remand. 166 The court concluded that a new provision that defines a substantive right should not be applied at any
stage of an ongoing lawsuit-including proceedings on remandbecause it is simply unfair to hold a party accountable for conduct
that was not illegal when it occurred. 167 The court, however, distinguished this type of provision from one that is either procedural
or remedial in nature, stating68 that new procedural and remedial
provisions could be applied.1

The Mozee court acknowledged that there might be good reasons for a court to apply procedural and remedial provisions on
remand that were not in effect at the time of the original trial. 169 In
light of the Bowen presumption, however, the court recognized the
general necessity of applying only those provisions that were in effect when the proceedings began. 170 The Mozee court stated, moreover, that the application of the Act's procedural and remedial
provisions on remand would result in one set of laws governing
remanded claims and a different set of laws governing claims affirmed on appeal. 17 ' Deeming this result inequitable and confus-

that no provision of the Act should be
ing, the court concluded
12
applied on remand.

In his dissent, Judge Cudahy criticized the majority for applying
an abstract and mechanical analysis that he believed resulted in a
conclusion that was neither rational nor just. He stated that the
majority applied law that was not relied on at the time the discriminatory acts took place, was not given legal effect at the time the
165. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 937. The court recognized that where, as here, litigation had
spanned fifteen years, changing trial procedures once the case had reached the appellate
level for a third time would create injustice. Id.
Regarding the damages provisions under Section 102, the court found that Bradley
would only apply to situations where damages provisions did not affect substantive rights.
Id. Because the issue of damages had not been raised previously during the interlocutory
appeal, retroactive application of the damages provisions in Section 102 would not alter
the court's previous decision. Id. at 938.
166. Id. at 939.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. This is especially true, the court added, where the law would be applied
retroactively to a completely new proceeding, thus eliminating the danger of duplicate
proceedings of the same issue. Id.
170. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 940. Thus, a trial court would avoid the confusion of scrutinizing a statute section-by-section to distinguish between those provisions regulating substantive, procedural, and remedial rights. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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lawsuit was brought, and was not in effect at the time of the appeal. 73 4In his view, the majority's analysis produced an unjust
7
result.
In Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone Company, 7 5 a second
panel of Seventh Circuit judges agreed with the Mozee decision,
again concluding that the 1991 Act should not apply retroactively.
The plaintiff in Luddington had been denied several promotions,
and subsequently
he sued his employer, alleging racial
76
1
discrimination.
The Luddington court noted that the Bradley 17 7 line of cases applied the presumption that a statute should be applied retroactively.17 8 Though it did not mention Bowen, the court noted that in
other decisions the Supreme Court had ruled against retroactive
application of a statute.17 9 Despite this conflict, the Luddington
court concluded that, in the absence of clear judicial and congressional guidance, courts should follow the traditional "rule of law,"
which limits the applicability of a new law to future conduct
only. 180
173. Id at 940 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized the relevance of the
legislative overruling of the Supreme Court decision in Patterson. Judge Cudahy asserted
that the effect of the Act was to restore the law to the same position as it had been in
when the case arose. Thus, the Act imposed no new liabilities on the parties. Id. at 941
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
174. Id (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The majority stated that although the result was
unfortunate, it was neither irrational nor unjust. Id at 938 n.4. The majority concluded
that the Patterson decision suggested that the cases before it had incorrectly interpreted
the former Act. Id. at 938. Furthermore, because this case had been ongoing for fifteen
years, it would have been unjust to remand under a new statute. Id.
175. 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992).
176. Id at 226. The plaintiff filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees the right to
contract. The district court granted the company summary judgment. Id. While the
case was on appeal from the district court's decision, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Id.
177. See discussion supra sec. I.B. 1.
178. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229. The court noted that this presumption applied "at
least... to cases pending on the statute's effective date." Id.
179. Id. "Justice Scalia examined the two lines of cases in Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 841 (Scalia, J., concurring) and pronounced
them in 'irreconcilable contradiction.' We agree. We too have straddled this divide." Id.
For a discussion of Kaiser, see supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
180. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228. The court stated that those subject to the law
could then "conform their conduct" to the law and not be sanctioned for conduct that
they previously thought was lawful. Id.
Furthermore, the issue in Luddington centered around the legislative overruling of Patterson. Id. at 225. In this regard, the court continued, when Congress overrules a
Supreme Court decision, "it is not registering disagreement with the merits of what the
Court did; it is laying down a new rule of conduct-ordinarily for the future." Id.
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According to the Luddington court, had the 1991 Act made only
technical changes to the existing law, the presumption of prospective application would have been rebutted. 8" The court noted,
however, that the Act altered remedies, procedures, and evidentiary burdens.' 82 Because these substantial changes in the law
might have a great effect on a party's future conduct,' the court
held that the Act should only be applied to conduct that takes
place after the statute's effective date.18 4 According to the Luddington court, retroactive application of the Act to cases that were
pending on November 21, 1991 would significantly disrupt ongoing
litigation and would also defeat the reliance interests of
employers.8 15
B.

The Split in the DistrictCourts

Though three courts of appeals have agreed that the Act should
not apply retroactively, the inconsistent district court decisions
suggest that the question is far from settled."8 6 Although district
courts have split on the issue, 8 7 most of these cases were decided
181. Id. at 228-29. The court observed that the 1991 Act does not prohibit any conduct not already prohibited by Title VII. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 229. The court noted that the new statute subjects defendant employers to
greater liability. Id.
184. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229. Thus, the plaintiff's Section 1981 claims were
precluded, but his claims under Title VII remained unaffected. Id. at 230.
185. Id. The court maintained that the situation in this case would be representative
of many others. Id. (stating that a case in its sixth year of litigation would have to be
remanded). Similarly, numerous other cases would also have to be remanded, creating
"massive dislocations" in the litigation process. Id
186. See infra note 187 and cases cited therein.
187. See Fray, 960 F.2d at 1383. The Fray court noted that the following district
court decisions have held against applying the Act retroactively: Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1992); McCormick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 786
F. Supp. 563 (N.D. W. Va. 1992); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F. Supp. 1054 (D.D.C.
1992); Rowson v. County of Arlington, 786 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Va. 1992); Sofferin v.
American Airlines, 785 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Guillory-Wuerz v. Brady, 785 F.
Supp. 889 (D. Colo. 1992); McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Toney v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Ala. 1992); McCullough v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Hameister v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 785
F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Percell v. International Business Machs., Inc., 785 F.
Supp. 1229 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Steinle v. Boeing Co., 785 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Kan. 1992);
Cook v. Foster Forbes Glass, 783 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Thompson v. Johnson
& Johnson Mgmt. Info. Ctr., 783 F. Supp. 893 (D.N.J. 1992); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 784 F. Supp. 268 (M.D.N.C. 1992); Kimble v. DPCE, Inc., 784 F. Supp.
250 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Thomas v. Frank, 791 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.J. 1992); Tyree v. Riley,
783 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1992); Maddox v. Norwood Clinic, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 582
(N.D. Ala. 1992); West v. Pelican Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 782 F. Supp. 1132 (M.D. La.
1992); Doe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 783 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Burchfield
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before the Sixth Circuit handed down its decision in Vogel. 88 It
remains to be seen whether district court judges will tailor future
retroactivity decisions to conform with the slowly emerging body
of appellate holdings.
The split in the district courts can be traced to the Supreme
Court's seemingly irreconcilable decisions in Bradley and Bowen.' 89
Courts concluding that the Act should be applied retroactively
have generally followed Bradley,190 while most of those holding
against retroactivity have cited Bowen as controlling. 191 Some
courts have concluded that under either approach the Act should
not be applied retroactively. 92 Courts focusing their analyses
solely on the statutory language have reached predictably contrav. Derwinski, 782 F. Supp. 532 (D. Colo. 1992); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F.
Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992); Futch v. Stone, 782 F. Supp. 284 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Sorlucco
v. New York City Police Dept., 780 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Van Meter v. Barr,
778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 778 F. Supp 1126 (D.
Colo. 1991).
In contrast, the Fray court noted that the following district court decisions have held
that all or parts of the Act apply retroactively: Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921 (N.D.
Cal. 1992); Andrade v. Crawford & Co., 786 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Sample v.
Keystone Carbon Co., 786 F. Supp. 527 (W.D. Pa. 1992); United States v. Department of
Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Poston v. Reliable Drug Stores, Inc.,
783 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. Ind. 1992); Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226,
783 F. Supp. 531 (D. Nev. 1992); Watkins v. Bessemer State Tech. College, 782 F. Supp.
581 (N.D. Ala. 1992); Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Fla.
1992); Long v. Carr, 784 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Graham v. Bodine Electric Co.,
782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Goldsmith v. Atmore, 782 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Ala.
1992); Saltarikos v. Charter Mfg. Co., 782 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Stender v.
Lucky Stores, Inc. 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); King v. Shelby Medical Center,
779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
188. 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992); see discussion supra sec. III.A.
189. See Steinle v. Boeing, 785 F. Supp. 1434, 1442 (D. Kan. 1992); see also Sanders
v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226, 783 F. Supp. 531, 538 (D. Nev. 1992) ("This
Court fails to see how these two cases [Bowen and Bradley] can be reconciled.").
190. See, e.g., Poston v. Reliable Drug Stores, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 1166, 1168-69 (S.D.
Ind. 1992) (applying Bradley in a complaint alleging racially motivated harassment);
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit has followed Bradley).
191. See, e.g., Steinle, 785 F. Supp. at 1442. The court stated:
Because there is no clear evidence from the statute or its history to indicate that
it should be applied to pending cases and because this court must apply the
Bowen presumption, the court concludes that the statute is not to be applied
retroactively to cases pending at the time the Act was enacted.
Id.
192. Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The court
determined that under Bowen the Act should be applied prospectively because there is no
clear legislative intent to the contrary. Id. at 784. Additionally, the court stated that the
Act should be applied prospectively under Bradley because it fails all three elements of
the manifest injustice test. Id.
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dictory conclusions. 93 For example, at least one court was persuaded that Congress, by including Sections 402(b) and 109(c),
which are expressly prospective, intended the rest of the Act to
apply retroactively. 94 In contrast, other courts have concluded
that the omission of retroactive provisions in the 1991 Act indicates that Congress intended the entire Act to apply
prospectively. 9 5
Noting the Act's ambiguous language and inconclusive legislative history, several courts have simply focused on reaching a fair
result when determining whether the Act should be applied retroactively. 19 6 For example, in considering the retroactive application
of Section 102, one court held that the employer-defendant's matured rights would not be affected because the conduct that triggered the action was unlawful even before the Act was passed.' 97
As illustrated by these divergent opinions, the district courts have
analyzed and interpreted the Act inconsistently, have frustrated
parties, and have produced a cottage industry of needless appellate
litigation in the process.
C The EEOC Position
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced
that it would not seek damages in any cases, whether filed before or
after the Act's effective date, that alleged pre-Act conduct. 's This
193. See, e.g., Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226, 783 F. Supp. 531,
537-39 (D. Nev. 1992) (discussing the inconsistent precedents and finding that they cannot be reconciled).
194. See, e.g., id. at 537. The court stated that "if the Act were only to apply prospectively these provisions would be superfluous." Id. In addition, the court noted that
the fact that the Act is to take immediate effect indicates Congress' belief that application
of its provisions was urgent. Id.
195. See, e.g., Maddox v. Norwood Clinic, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 582, 585 (N.D. Ala.
1992) (determining that provisions omitted from the 1990 bill and previous draft versions
suggest congressional intent to have the final 1991 Act apply only prospectively).
196. See, e.g., Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325, 329
(D.D.C. 1992) (following an approach that combines both the Bradley and Bowen tests
and concludes that a presumption of retroactivity only applies where deprivation of
vested or matured rights would not occur).
197. Id. at 332.
198. EEOCPolicy Guidance on Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Labor
Report (BNA), No. 1, at D-1 (January 2, 1992) [hereinafter EEOCPolicy Guidance]. At
the time of enactment, at least 850 court cases were pending, and more than 60,000
charges were on file with the EEOC. Employers' Group Urges EEOC to Enforce Omnibus
Civil Rights Law Prospectively, Daily Labor Report, (BNA), No. 225, at A-5 (November
21, 1991) [hereinafter Employers' Group]. Of the court cases, between 400 and 500 involved claims of intentional discrimination for which compensatory (and perhaps punitive) damages would have been available under the 1991 Act if the conduct had occurred
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announcement also reflected the confusion generated by the language of Section 402(a), the Act's ambiguous legislative history,
and the Supreme Court's conflicting views on retroactivity. The
EEOC acknowledged that the language of the Act was unclear regarding its applicability to pending cases and to post-Act charges
challenging pre-Act conduct.199 The EEOC also questioned
whether the inclusion of the two prospective-only sections necessarily implied that the remainder of the Act should apply retroactively.2c ° Citing Bowen, the EEOC concluded that the language of
the two sections did not require such a result.2°0 The EEOC also
acknowledged that a court choosing to take a different approach
would probably reach a different result.20 2 Nevertheless, the
EEOC concluded that it would adhere to Bowen, which represented the Court's "more recent" position, 20 3 and that it would not

read the remedial provisions of the Act to apply retroactively.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Until the Supreme Court resolves its conflicting positions on the
issue of retroactivity, or until Congress amends and clarifies its ambiguously drafted legislation, the question of retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will continue to cause
confusion. Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the Court is likely
to act on this issue in the near future. Because the language of the
statute does not provide the answer, and the legislative history is
inconclusive, courts must turn to the Supreme Court's confusing
precedent for guidance.
Because both the Thorpe-Bradley and Bowen approaches remain
good law, the judiciary will probably continue to disagree on the
relative merits of each line of cases. Justice Scalia has stated that
the Court should adopt a blanket prohibition against retroactivity
after the effective date. EEOC Declares 1991 Civil Rights Act Does Not Apply to Pre-Act
Conduct, Daily Labor Report (BNA), No. 1 at A-8 (January 2, 1992). The Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC), an employers' group, urged Chairman Kemp to
proclaim a prospective-only policy because the retroactive language of the 1990 bill had
been deleted in the final 1991 version. Employers' Group, supra, at A-5. Therefore, the
EEAC contended, the Act could apply prospectively only. Id.
199. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 198, at D-1.
200. Id. The EEOC acknowledged that the two sections "may create an inference
that the remainder of the Act has retroactive effect." Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (determining that accepting the Bowen presumption supports prospectiveonly application and accepting the Bradley-Thorpe presumption supports retroactive
application).
203. Id.
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and return to the "traditional view" that legislation should only
apply prospectively unless otherwise specifically indicated. 2
A.

Response to Justice Scalia: Why Thorpe-Bradley Is The
Better Approach

Arguably, the Bowen decision only controls cases that involve an
administrative agency's rule-making authority.2"5 Indeed, the
Bowen Court never discussed the Thorpe-Bradley approach to retroactivity. 2°0 While at least one court has stated that the circumstances of Thorpe and Bradley were "unique, "207 and did not,
therefore, give rise to a general presumption of retroactivity, strict
adherence to a contrary presumption would have prevented even
those "unique" plaintiffs from litigating their claims. ThorpeBradley offers a more equitable approach than Bowen does, because
the latter, which requires inflexible adherence to an unyielding
standard, unreasonably denies relief to too many injured parties.
The paramount consideration, therefore, is a principle of basic
fairness.20" Underlying not only this principle, but also the presumption against retroactivity, is the premise that parties should
not be held accountable for laws that were not in existence at the
time of their relevant conduct. 2°o The focus must necessarily turn,

then, to that conduct and to the effect that the retroactive applica204. Kaiser,494 U.S. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia finds that an analysis beginning with a presumption of retroactivity, pursuant to the Thorpe-Bradley rule,
is contradictory to legislative intent. Id. at 857. He believes that the manifest injustice
exception, advocated by Thorpe-Bradley, is no more than a "surrogate for policy preferences." Id. Adopting this line of reasoning, Justice Scalia maintains, is not "really talking about 'justice' at all, but about mercy, or compassion, or social utility .... Id.
An inflexible rule that would prohibit retroactive application of some new laws, however, cannot co-exist with the overriding jurisprudential policy of fairness to the parties.
Consider, for example, applying this concept to the Thorpe plaintiff. See discussion supra
sec. II.B. 1. It seems paradoxical that our legal system would rather evict a tenant in
violation of her constitutional rights rather than to force a government agency to apply
one of its own rules retroactively even though no hardship would befall the agency.
205. See supra sec. II.B.2.
206. The Supreme Court's statement that "retroactivity is not favored in the law,"
should not be read as a "blind acceptance" of this "historical" rule, especially in view of
the Court's subsequent decision not to overrule Bradley. See Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1381 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., dissenting); see also supra note
101.
207. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir.
1992).
208. See Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325, 329
(D.D.C. 1992).
209. See supra text accompanying note 167; see also Robinson, 790 F. Supp. at 329
(stating that "a person should not be held liable for conduct that was lawful at the time of
occurrence and which the person justifiably expected would remain so").
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tion of a new law would have on the rights of those parties.21 ° If
the parties enjoyed "vested or substantial" rights and justifiable expectations,21 then the retroactive application of a statute that interfered with those rights and expectations would undoubtedly be
unfair. This, for example, occurred in Bowen, where the retroactive application of the proposed new rule would have impaired the
justifiable expectations and matured rights of the plaintiffs.212
Nevertheless, had the Bowen court used the Thorpe-Bradley approach to resolve that dispute, it would have reached the same result. Although the Thorpe-Bradley approach presumes that a
statute should be applied retroactively, the presumption includes
two exceptions. A law will not be presumed to apply retroactively
if there is (1) evidence of contrary congressional intent or (2) evidence that retroactive application will result in a manifest injustice.21 3 These exceptions allow a court to block retroactive
application of a new statute whenever that application would be
inequitable. 214 Conversely, the Bowen doctrine fails to provide any
exceptions to its presumption against retroactivity.
B.

Application of the Supreme Court Doctrines to the 1991 Civil
Rights Act
In many instances, plaintiffs whose cases were pending on the
Act's enactment date have attempted to recover damages provided
by the Act because the conduct complained of was unlawful when
it occurred.21 5 If a court follows the Bowen presumption against
retroactivity, the plaintiffs will not be allowed to seek damages
210. See Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[M]any of us would squawk very loudly indeed if people with unpaid parking tickets
were made retroactively liable to life imprisonment; and in fact such a change although
purely remedial would violate the ex post facto clause."). However, even though this
example was only a hypothetical, the penalty is disproportionate to the conduct. Additionally, an analysis under Thorpe-Bradley would find this scenario to result in manifest
injustice to the defendant.
211. See supra note 75.
212. See supra sec. II.B.2.
213. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
214. Justice Scalia cautioned against extended discretion bestowed upon federal
judges under the Bradley test. Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 857. However, in a somewhat contradictory remark, he also stated that a "clear reaffirmation of the presumption of nonretroactivity" will not always make a court's decision "simple" and that it will "remain
difficult" to determine whether that presumption has been overcome. Id.
215. See, e.g., Fray, 960 F.2d 1370 (finding that prior to the 1991 amendment, such
conduct "was clearly actionable under Title VII"); Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile Co., 784
F. Supp. 872, 879 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (concluding that retroactive application would not
impose an additional obligation on the defendant and that it would merely supplement
the remedies available to the plaintiff).
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under the Act because of the inflexible presumption against retroactivity. The scope and severity of the alleged discriminatory conduct are irrelevant under this view. In contrast, the ThorpeBradley approach, which requires a court to consider whether a
manifest injustice 216 would result if the new Act is applied retroactively, places a greater premium on fairness to the parties. To bar a
plaintiff's recovery in the name of a doctrine that disfavors retroactivity is to contravene Congress' chief reason for passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Congress intended to provide appropriate
remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment
in the workplace.21 7
V.

PROPOSAL

Until the Supreme Court resolves the issue of statutory retroactivity by reconciling or overruling its conflicting decisions, the
1991 Civil Rights Act will provide inconsistent protection to plaintiffs whose cases were pending on the Act's effective date. To that
end, the Supreme Court should either limit the holding in Bowen to
the context of administrative law, clarify Bowen's relationship to
Thorpe-Bradley, or explain the circumstances under which each
approach should be followed.
In the interim, courts should apply the Thorpe-Bradley approach. The flexibility of this approach will ensure that a plaintiff's claims will not be foreclosed until a court has weighed a
variety of factors. Moreover, the Thorpe-Bradley approach will
not and should not result in retroactive application of a new provision in every instance. 2 18 A court should not be bound by rigid
rules that prevent it from conducting a thorough analysis of the
matters at bar. Similarly, a plaintiff should not be denied recovery
because of a court's mechanical approach.
Some courts have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed in their requests to seek damages under the Act, 219 concluding that the
216. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the factors to be applied under the manifest injustice test).
217. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., McCullough v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-16
(N.D. Ill. 1992). The court refused to apply the Act's damages provisions retroactively
because doing so would result in manifest injustice. Id. The court found that if the Act
applied, the defendant employer faced potential liability for unanticipated amounts of
damages. Id. Therefore, the court held that the Act created new and substantial rights
and liabilities. Id.
219. See, e.g., Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325
(D.D.C. 1992) (permitting the plaintiff alleging racial and gender discrimination to proceed with amended complaint seeking damages). A strict Bowen analysis would have
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vested rights of defendant employers would not be affected by retroactive application of the new remedial provisions.220 These
courts have stated that retroactive application of the Act's new remedial provisions only ensures enforcement of laws already in
existence.221 Courts adhering to the Bowen presumption never
reach this step. As a result, their decisions fail to deter unlawful
conduct and, in effect, they give credence to a wrongdoer's argument that, had the new provisions been in effect at the time the
discriminatory acts occurred, the defendant would have thought
twice about engaging in such conduct. 222 The Thorpe-Bradley rule
allows a court to consider society's need to impose punishment
upon those defendants who knowingly violate the law. This option
is not open to courts that follow the Bowen approach. Therefore,
with respect to the applicability of the new remedial provisions,
Thorpe-Bradley is the better alternative because it requires courts
to weigh all facts and possibilities. A plaintiff, whose case alleging
unlawful discriminatory conduct was pending on November 21,
1991, should not be denied the protection of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 solely because those protections were not in effect when the
alleged wrongdoing occurred.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is ambiguous with
respect to the Act's possible retroactive effect on cases pending as
of November 21, 1991. Because the Act's legislative intent is inconclusive, a court called upon to construe the meaning of the new
law must rely on Supreme Court precedent regarding the issue of
retroactivity. However, the Court's decisions in this area suggest
two conflicting approaches to the problem. Because both of these
approaches remain viable, a lower court confronted with the retroactivity problem should decide the question by focusing on principles of fairness as dictated by the individual facts of the case. A
court should not apply a mechanical rule against retroactivity; instead, it should address the issue in light of all relevant factors pursuant to the Thorpe-Bradley doctrine. By following the Thorpecompletely foreclosed the plaintiff from seeking damages without any consideration of the
underlying facts.
220. Id. at 332. The court found that Section 102 of the Act only addresses the
"longstanding prohibition" against intentional discrimination. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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Bradley rule, a court will ensure a thorough analysis of the issues
while safeguarding an aggrieved party's right to relief.
LINDA URBANIK

